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Nowadays, more and more digital images are being sent over computer networks.  The 
works presented in this chapter show how encryption and watermarking algorithms give 
security in medical imagery.  In order to do this, the images can be encrypted in their 
source codes in order to apply this functionality at the application level. In this way, the 
functionalities of encryption and watermarking images are inserted at the software level. 
We can therefore guarantee the protection of a medical image during transmission, and 
also once this digital data is archived.  The next challenge is to ensure that such coding 
withstands serious treatments such as compression. The quantity of information (entropy) 
to be sent increases greatly from the original image to the encrypted image.  In the case of 
certain types of medical imagery, large homogenous zones appear. These zones affect the 
effectiveness of the coding algorithms.  Nevertheless, these homogenous zones, useless 
for any diagnosis, can be safely used for the watermarking of medical images. 
 
When a doctor receives a visit of a patient, he often needs a specialist opinion before 
giving a diagnosis. One possible solution is to send images of the patient, along with a 
specialist report, over a computer network. Nevertheless, computer networks are complex 
and eavesdropping is a potential risk. We are therefore faced with a real security problem 
when sending data.  For ethical reasons, medical imagery cannot be sent when such a risk 
is present, and has to be better protected. Encryption is the best form of protection in 
cases such as this. Many different techniques for the encryption of text already exist.  
Since Ancient times, humanity has always attempted to encode secret messages in order 
to elude wandering indiscreet eyes and ears. The most basic forays into this field relied 
upon algorithms which allowed coding and decoding. Over time, the notion of a key 
arose. Today, encryption systems rely upon algorithms which are available to the world at 
large, and it is the key, a code which remains confidential, which allows for the 
encryption and decryption of the message [KER 83].   
 
In section 10.2 we will show how essential it is to ensure the security of medical imagery 
and data. Then in section 10.3 we will present the standard encryption algorithms and 
will show, in section 10.4, how these can be suited to medical imagery. Finally, in section 
10.5, we will show how it is possible to hide data in these images, while retaining a high 
quality of image. 
 
10.2. Protection of medical imagery and data 
 
Developments in the techniques for the treatment, sharing, and communication of 
medical imagery, and medical information in general, go alongside an increased risk for 
information in a digital format. Medical information in general is made up chiefly of the 
results of analyses, clinical and para-clinical examinations, and personal information 
[DUS 97]. Possibilities for distant access and the sending of information have increased 
the chances of leaks, losses, and alterations of the information which are also greater due 
to, or even helped by, the availability of network surveillance tools and advanced editing 
tools such as imagery software. 
 
However, it is the consequences brought about by the occurrence of these risks which 
create the need for the protection of medical information. These consequences, which are 
not negligible, concern an individual and his health, such a part of its privacy. This is why 
many countries have given legal and ethical weight to this question; acknowledging 
patients’ rights and thereby obliging medical professionals and health centres to ensure 
the protection of the data in their possession. 
 
10.2.1. Legislation and patients’ rights 
 
Legislation and the medical ethics code accompanies the technical evolution and, through 
a number of important legal texts, recognises patients’ rights. The first, and best-known, 
refers specifically to the patient-doctor relationship and concerns medical secrecy. The 
guaranteed secrecy of any information which a patient may exchange with anyone in the 
healthcare system allows a trusting relationship to be established. This relationship also 
allows the healthcare professional to judge the patient’s situation as effectively as 
possible. 
 
The computerisation of the health system and the possibilities this offers both in terms of 
the mechanisation of treatments and the sharing of information, has resulted in the 
widening of the legal coverage of the field, and new laws must be taken into account by 
healthcare professionals.  In particular (in France) law no. 78-17 of 6th January 1978 – 
known as the ‘information technology and freedom law’, complemented by the law of 1st 
January 1994, the ‘law pertaining to the treatment of data, with regard to health sector 
research’.  In France, the CNIL (National Commission on IT and Liberty) has the task of 
ensuring that these laws are respected (articles 6 to 13). These laws, aside from the 
collection of information, give every citizen – and therefore every patient – the right to 
control the use of information which concerns them personally [DUC 96].  In particular, 
the patient has a right to security, and article 29 states that it is the responsibility of the 
healthcare professional to take ‘every possible measure to ensure the security of the 
information, and particularly to ensure that it is not altered, damaged, or allowed to reach 
unauthorised third parties’. If this law is not respected, legal measures can be taken 
(article 226-17 of the penal code).  From a practical and technical point of view, working 
groups such as that put in place by the European Standards Committee TC/251 Medical 
Information (Working Group III), show that in order for this criteria to be met, the 
following must be achieved [ALL 94]: 
 
- the confidentiality of the data, by restricting access to only the rightful owners 
(the patient and the healthcare professionals dealing with his case, considering the 
collaborative nature of medical practice and derogations allowed by the law); 
- the integrity of the information, ensuring that the information has not been 
modified by anyone but a qualified person in agreed conditions; 
- the availability , which guarantees access to the data within standard procedure. 
 
10.2.2. A wide range of protection measures 
 
Whatever the nature of the information, we can distinguish three types of protection 
measures for data stored, treated, and sent by an information system: the legislation, 
security policies, and protection mechanisms. These measures should be considered 
together in order to meet the AIC requirements (Availability, Integrity and 
Confidentiality) for the data. Nevertheless, these measures vary amongst themselves 
according to the target information system and its context. We can draw a difference 
between the systems installed at a single practitioner’s practice from those of a health 
centre – be they fitted or not with communication applications such as telemedicine 
applications. 
 
The first type of legal measure aims to discourage those who would infringed deliberately 
or accidentally the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and information 
systems (e.g. in France, the Godfrain Law no. 88-19 of 05/01/1998). However, such 
measures are only effective if it is possible to detect the intrusion of a third party into an 
information system.  A healthcare establishment’s security policy aims to set the strategy 
for the implementation and upkeep of the highest security level. This policy decides, 
among other things, various protocols for the usage of information and systems, 
considering: the risks to the AIC of the data and the specific roles of the various parties 
present in the hospital framework.  Especially, it is up to the security policy to decide and 
regulate the use of protection tools and mechanisms. These physical or logical 
mechanisms are numerous and entail more or less complex procedures to be carried out.  
The first group deals with the physical protection of the material (restricted access to the 
rooms concerned, steps to avoid damage from the elements, to prevent theft etc.), and the 
second group is integrated into the information systems. The tools which we will study in 
this chapter fall into this second category; cryptographic tools (encoding and digital 
signatures) and the watermarking of images. Among the other logic protection 
mechanisms we can include [COA 03]: 
- Access control which includes a policy determining those with a right to the 
information or access to the workings of a system, and technical solutions for the 
identification of users, such as chip-card systems, or biometric screening; 
- Firewalls whose primary task is to control access to the system both at the entry 
and exit stages, as soon as the system is connected to a network; 
- Antivirus systems; 
- Auditing which allows us to keep a record of the access made to the information 
by users or computer programs. 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that these mechanisms are complementary, and are 
therefore to be used side-by-side. Additionally, some of these mechanisms, such as access 
restriction, rely upon cryptographic systems. The watermarking of images has come into 
use more recently, and has found its place among the range of tools.  Before discussing 
these techniques, let us return to medical imagery. These images are often produced, 
stored, and communicated with the DICOM standard described in chapter 4. This 
standard is more than a simple storage format, and includes very specific ‘profiles’ or 
procedures, with the aim of guaranteeing the AIC requirements for storage and exchange 
between DICOM-compatible systems. These profiles are based on cryptographic 
mechanisms. 
 
10.3. Basics of encryption algorithms 
 
10.3.1. Encryption algorithm classification 
 
There are four key objectives for the encryption of digital data: 
 
- confidentiality or masking of the data - the most widely-used characteristic – 
which aims to render the cryptogram unintelligible to anyone without the key; 
- authentication allows the sender to sign his message, thereby leaving the recipient 
in no doubt as to who sent the message; 
-  integrity serves to assure the recipient that the message content has not been 
altered or manipulated since its creation; 
- non-repudiation is the guarantee that neither of the parties involved will be able to 
deny having sent or received the message; 
 
The most important objective for medical imagery is, naturally, the first: confidentiality.  
But the notion of integrity described in section 10.2., as well as the two others, is also 
important in the protection of medical imagery. 
 
Encryption algorithms can be separated out according to various characteristics: the 
systems with a secret key (symmetrical systems), illustrated in figure 10.1, and those with 
public and private keys (asymmetrical systems), shown in figure 10.2 [DIF 76], [STI 96].  
The secret key systems are those which allow for encryption and decryption with the 
same key.  It goes without saying that the sender and the recipient must beforehand have 
exchanged the secret of this key, via a secure method of communication. The systems 
using a public or asymmetric key can overcome this step by using one key to encrypt the 
data, and another to decrypt it. Each person should possess a pair of keys, one of which 
be confidential (the private key) and the other known by the world at large (the public 
key). In order to write to B, all that needs to happen is for the message to be encoded with 
the public key of B, which is known. Upon reception, only B will be able to decrypt the 
message with his private key. In this section, we present several data encryption systems; 
symmetric block systems, with secret key (DES and AES); asymmetric block system, 



















Figure 10.2. Top: basis of asymmetric encryption; Bottom: double asymmetric 
Encryption, guaranteeing confidentiality and authenticity 
 
10.3.2. The DES encryption algorithm 
 
The DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm is one of the standard systems for 
encryption by block (figure 10.1). Its security relies entirely upon the secrecy of the key, 
as the algorithm is public. In 1974, the DES algorithm became the first standard of 
modern cryptography [SCH 95]. The DES algorithm is based on 16 rounds, (a collection 
of stages repeated 16 times) during which a data block of 64 bits is mixed with the key K, 
which is also encoded on 64 bits. At each of these rounds, a sub-key ki is calculated from 
the initial key K (this sub-key will serve to mix up the block’s bits). Once the 16 sub-keys 
have been generated from the secret key, it is possible to cipher (or decipher) a 64-bit 
block of data. The process begins with an initial permutation (IP) which changes the 
order of the bits in the initial block, before splitting the result in two blocks of 32 bits, L0 
and R0 . Once the 16 rounds have been passed, and before giving the result, a final 
permutation must be applied to the block. This permutation is no more than the inversion 
of the IP. For the decryption, the process is the same, apart from the fact that the sub-keys 
are used in the opposite order. 
 
Today, even if the algorithm still good, it suffers somewhat from the fact that the length 
of its key is limited to 64 bits. The current performance-levels of machines, in terms of 
computational time, make DES breakable. The so-called brutal attack involves trying all 
of the 264 potential keys, and is nowadays feasible for big calculators. A solution has been 
produced to increase the security level: it is called the triple-DES. The triple DES 
involves the encryption of the entry block three times with three different keys: K1, K2 
and K3. There are several variations, but in general the first and third operations are 
encryption operations, whereas the second is a decryption operation. Often, we choose 
that K1 = K3, which does not allow the whole key to go beyond 128 bits. 
 
10.3.3. The AES encryption algorithm 
 
The AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm is the standard system for 
encryption by block and aims to replace the DES which has become vulnerable. The 
number of rounds in the AES algorithm depends upon the size of the key and the size of 
the data blocks. For example, the number of rounds is 9 if the blocks and the key have a 
length of 128 bits. To encrypt a block of data with AES (figure 10.3), we must first of all 
complete a stage called ‘AddRoundKey’, which involves applying an ‘exclusive OR’ 
(XOR) between a sub-key and the block. After, we enter into the operation of a round.  
Each regular round operation involves four steps. The first step is called ‘SubByte’, 
where each byte of the block is replaced by another value created by an S-box. The 
second step is called ‘ShiftRow’, where the rows are cyclically moved with different 
offsets. In the third step, called ‘MixColumn’, each column is treated as a polynomial 
which is multiplied with a matrix in the GF(28) (Galois Field). The final step of a round is 
again called ‘AddRoundKey’, which is a simple XOR between the given data and the 
sub-key of the given round. The AES algorithm carries out a final additional stage made 
up of the ‘SubByte’, ‘ShiftRow’, and ‘AddRoundKey’ stages before producing the final 
encryption. The process applied to the 'plaintext' (original data) is independent of that 
applied to the secret key, with the latter being called ‘KeySchedule’. This is made-up of 






Figure 10.3. General AES scheme 
 
The AES algorithm can support the following encryption modes: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, 
CTR and etc. The ECB (Electronic CodeBook) mode is that of the standard AES 
algorithm as described in document 197 of the FIPS (Federal Information Processing 
Standards). From a binary sequence X1, X2,..., Xn of plaintext blocks, each Xi is encrypted 
with the same secret key k in order to produce the coded blocks Y1, Y2,.., Yn. The CBC 
(Cipher Block Chaining) mode adds a step before the encryption. Each encrypted block Yi 
is added by an XOR to the new current block Xi+1 before being encrypted with the key k. 
An initialisation vector (IV) is used for the first iteration. Indeed, all the modes apart from 
ECB need an IV.  In the CFB (Cipher FeedBack) mode, IV = Y0 . The dynamic key (or 
key stream) Zi is generated by Zi = Ek(Yi−1), i > 1, and the encrypted block is produced by 
Yi = Xi⊕Zi. In the OFB (Output FeedBack) mode, as in the CFB, Yi = Xi⊕Zi but VI = Z0 
and Zi = Ek(Zi−1), i > 1. The input data is encrypted after an XOR with the output Zi . The 
CTR (Counter) mode has characteristics very similar to those of OFB, but it also allows 
to a random access for the decryption. It generates the following dynamic key by 
encryption of the successive value provided by a counter. This counter can be a simple 
function which produces a pseudo-random sequence. In this mode, the output of the 
counter is the entry of the AES algorithm. 
 
Even if AES is an algorithm of encryption by block, the modes OFB, CFB, and CTR 
operate like stream ciphers. These modes require no particular measure concerning the 
length of messages. Each mode has its own advantages and disadvantages. In the ECB 
and OFB modes, for example, any change in the plaintext Xi results in a modification in 
the corresponding encrypted block Yi, but the other encrypted blocks are not affected. On 
the other hand, if a plaintext Xi is changed in the CBC and CFB modes, then Yi and the 
newt encrypted blocks will be affected. These properties mean that the CBC and CFB 
modes are useful for authentication, and the ECB and OFB modes treat each block 
separately. As a result, we can note that the OFB mode does not propagate noise, whereas 
the CFB mode does. 
 
10.3.4. Asymmetric block system: RSA 
 
The RSA algorithm is the most widely-used asymmetric system. Its security relies upon 
the slowness of current computers for factorising very large numbers into products of 
prime numbers [SCH 95], [SHA 78]. Let p and q be two very large distinct prime 
numbers, and n a very large number which is the product of p and q. We write as φ(n) the 
Euler function in n in order to have numbers smaller than n and first with n, with φ(n) = 
(p-1)(q-1). 
 
The public key/private key pair will reside in two numbers, d and e associated to n. e is 
first calculated randomly between 2 and φ(n) and must be prime with φ(n). The (n,e) pair 
is the public key. Then d is calculated such as d = e−1mod(n). The extended Euclide 
algorithm allows the calculation of this inversion, even in the case of very large numbers.  
The (n,d) pair is the private key. The use of keys for the encryption and the decryption is 
as follows. If m is the original message (lower than n, otherwise it is cut), we encrypt it 
with the public key (n,e) raising it to the power e, modulo n. We obtain the encrypted 
message m’ = memod(n). For the decryption, we need the private key second key (n,d).  
By rising the encrypted message to the power d modulo n and as d and e are inverted 
modulo n, we obtain: 
 
mnmnnmnm edded === )mod()mod())mod(()mod()'(    [10.1] 
 
For example, if Bob wishes to send a message to Alice, he converts his message into 
numbers, and cuts the message into blocks of a size smaller than n. For each block mi, 
using Alice’s public key, Bob calculates and codes the block as follows: 
 
),mod(nmc eii =         [10.2] 
 
with i, the position of the block in the text, i ∈ [1,N], if N is the number of blocks. 
 
Alice, with her private key, can then decrypt the message by doing: 
 
)mod(ncm dii =         [10.3] 
 
Thus, the RSA method differs from the symmetrical encryption systems in that it uses 
two different keys for encryption and decryption (figure 10.2). One of these two keys, the 
public key is meant to be known to everyone, and the other, the private key, is known to 
only one individual. The RSA algorithm can allow either encryption with a public key, in 
which case only the recipient will be able to decrypt the message with his private key or 
encryption with one’s own private key (signature). In this case, everyone can read the 
message thanks to the public key, but the sender was able to sign the message, since he is 
potentially the only person who could have encrypted it with his private key. A double 
encryption, using public key/private key therefore allows combining a signature with 
confidentiality (figure 10.2-bottom). 
 
Unfortunately, RSA is a very slow algorithm; much slower than any symmetrical system, 
and even more so because the numbers used are very large. Moreover, it is easily 
breakable today, even for 512 bits3 numbers. It is currently advisable to use keys 1024 
bits long. It is therefore preferable to use it to send a secret key in a secure way, which 
will allow the message to be decrypted, with AES faster than RSA. 
 
10.3.5. Algorithms for stream ciphering 
 
Algorithms for stream ciphering can be defined as algorithms for encryption by block, 
where each block has a unitary dimension (1 bit or 1 byte) or is relatively small. Their 
main advantages are their very high speed and their ability to change each symbol of the 
plaintext. With a stream cipher algorithm, it is possible to encrypt separately each 
character of the plaintext, by using an encryption function which varies each time (these 
algorithms therefore need memories). In general, algorithms for stream cipher are made 
up of two stages: the generation of a dynamic key (key stream) and the encryption output 
function using the dynamic key. 
 
When the dynamic key is created independently of the plaintext and the ciphertext, the 
stream cipher algorithm is synchronous.  With a stream cipher algorithm, the sender and 
receiver have to synchronize by using the same key, and using it at the same position.  
Synchronous stream ciphers are used in environments where error is common, because it 
has the advantage of not propagating errors [GUI 02]. Concerning active attacks, such as 
the insertion, deletion or copying of digits of the ciphertext by an active adversary, these 
attacks immediately result in a loss of the synchronization. The encryption process of a 
synchronous stream cipher is described in figure 10.4, where f() is the function which 
determines the following state, g() is the function generating the dynamic key, and h() is 
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where K is the key, si, mi, ci and zi are respectively the ith state, plaintext, ciphertext, and 




Figure 10.4. Synchronous stream cipher: encryption on the left, decryption on the right 
 
When the dynamic key is generated from the key and a certain number of previous 
ciphertext, the stream cipher algorithm is called asynchronous, also known as self 
synchronous stream cipher. The propagation of errors is limited to the size of the 
memory. If digits of the ciphertext are erased or added to, the receiver is able to 
resynchronise himself with the sender, by using the memory. As for active attacks, if an 
active adversary modifies any part of the digits of the ciphertext, the receiver will be able 
to detect this attack. The encryption process of an asynchronous stream cipher is 
described in figure 10.5, where g() is the function which generates the dynamic key, and 
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where K is the key, mi, ci and zi are respectively the ith plaintext, the ciphertext, and the 
dynamic key. We can notice in equations [10.5] that the dynamic key depends upon the 
previous t digits of the ciphertext. In order to resist to statistical attacks, the function g() 
which generates the dynamic key must produce a sequence of a wide period, with good 
statistical properties which can be called pseudo-random binary sequences. The 
decryption process is illustrated in figure 10.5. 
 
 
Figure 10.5.  Asynchronous stream cipher: encryption on the left, decryption on the right 
 
10.4. Medical image encryption 
 
In this section, we will show how it is possible to apply the above algorithms to medical 
images in grey level. In the case of 1D medical signal, the standard coding algorithms can 
be applied directly. However, because of the bidimensional characteristic of images, and 
their size, these standard algorithms must be modified in order to be used effectively on 
medical images. The aim of image encryption is to obtain an image in the same format 
and without a size bigger than the original image. The encryption of images is considered 
as a source coding to treat this functionality at the application level. Because of this, if a 
user does not possess the key, he does at least have access to an image in a known format.  
By carrying the encryption step up to the application level, it is possible to proceed, for 
example, towards a region of interest of the image. In the case of large images, it 
therefore becomes unnecessary to decrypt the whole image if we only want to view one 
particular area of it. The compression stage should also be taken into account during the 
image encryption stage. 
 
10.4.1. Image encryption by block 
 
In the case of encryption by block, the length of the blocks is fixed, and varies from 64 
bits (8 pixels) to 192 bits (24 pixels).  From the bidimensional information of an image, 
several pixel grouping solutions are possible. In the aim of withstanding a downstream 
compression as well as possible, or compressing at the same time as the coding, it is 
useful to group the pixels with their nearest neighbours (in rows, columns, or blocks).  
Each block of pixels is encrypted separately. The encrypted block obtained will then 
come to replace the original block in the image. In this chapter, the route taken for 
scanning the blocks is carried out only in a linear manner (scan line). Manniccam and 
Bourbakis show that it is often more useful to use other types of scanning (spirals, 
zigzags etc.) in order to combine encryption with lossless compression [MAN 01], [MAN 
04]. 
 
10.4.2. Coding images by asynchronous stream cipher 
 
In this section, we present an asynchronous stream cipher algorithm which is applied to 
images. Let K be a key of length k bits bi, K = b1b2...bk. The unit of encryption is the pixel 
(1 byte). The method lies in the fact that for each pixel of the image, the encryption 
depends upon the original pixel, the value of the key K, and the k/2pixels previously 
encrypted. To use the equations [10.5], we have t = k/2. For each pixel pi of the original 
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with i ∈ [0,…,N−1] where N is the number of pixels in the image, k is the length of the 
key with k ∈ [1,N], and αj is a sequence of k/2 coefficients generated from the secret key 
K [PUE 01a]. 
 
The encryption principle is the same as that shown in figure 10.5. The equations [10.6] 
have a recurrence of the order k/2, corresponding to half of the length of the key [PUE 
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with βj = 2b2j-1+b2j, où b2j-1 and b2j are two consecutive bits of the secret key K. In 
addition, the probability density of the αj must be uniform in order to reduce the 
transmission errors during the decryption stage. The sign in front of the coefficients equal 











α         [10.8] 
 
Considering that the encryption of a pixel is based on the k/2 pixels previously encrypted, 
we cannot code encrypt the k/2 first pixels of the image. It is necessary to associate the αi 
coefficients with a sequence of k/2 virtual encrypted pixels p’-i, for i ∈ [1,…,k/2]. This 
pixel sequence corresponds to an initialisation vector (IV). In consequence, an IV is 
coded in the key: k/2 values of virtual pixels which allow us to encrypt the k/2 first pixels 
of the image as though they had predecessors. The length k of the key K must be big 
enough to guarantee maximum security. Equation [10.9] presents the decryption 
procedure. In the decryption procedure, we must apply the process in reverse. We can 
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10.4.3. Applying encryption to medical images 
 
Starting out with the image in figure 10.6.a, we have applied the DES algorithm by 
blocks of 8 pixels in a row, with a 64-bit key to obtain the image in figure 10.6.c. We can 
observe the appearance of textures (figures 10.6.c-e). The reason for this phenomenon 
lies in the appearance of large homogeneous zones (black in this case) on the medical 
images. At the level of the histograms (figures 10.6.d-f), we observe the strong presence 
of grey levels corresponding to the encryption of the grey levels of the homogeneous 
zones. The encryption is therefore very poor for two reasons: firstly because it is easy to 
guess the nature of the medical image (an ultrasound), but mainly because the availability 
of the value of the plaintext block (the pixels were all black), and after encryption (the 
grey levels dominating in the encrypted image) is a precious clue for cryptanalysts.  
Block encryption algorithms therefore present us with serious problems when images 
contain homogeneous zones. 
 
a)  c)  e)  
 
b)  d)  f)  
 
Figure 10.6. a) medical ultrasound image (442KB), with large homogeneous zones, 
Encrypted image c) encrypted by DES algorithm (block of 8 pixels with a 64-bit key), 
e) by AES algorithm (block of 8 pixels with a 128-bit key) b), d), and f) histograms 
 
From the original image, figure 10.7.a (396x400 pixels), we have applied a stream cipher 
algorithm with a 128-bit key. Figure 10.7.c illustrates the values obtained for the dynamic 
key zi generated by the equation [10.6]. We can note that (figure 10.7.d) the probability of 
the appearance of each value is practically equal. And so, the function generating the 
dynamic key g() produces a sequence with a large period and good statistical properties.  
From the equations [10.6], we obtain an encrypted image (figure 10.7.e), and we can see 
that the initial image is no longer visible at all. By comparing the histogram of the initial 
image (figure 10.7.b), with the histogram of the encrypted image (figure 10.7.f), we can 
see that the density of probability of the grey levels is more or less identical. As a result, 
the entropies of the encrypted images are very high (around 8bits/pixel). 
 
a)  c)  e)  
b)  d)  f)  
Figure 10.7. a) original image, b) histogram of original image, c) image of the dynamic 
key zi, d) histogram of the values of the dynamic key zi, e) final encrypted image with the 
coding algorithm by asynchronous stream cipher, with a 128-bit key, f) histogram of the 
encrypted image 
 
Stream cipher has one major advantage over other encryption systems used in medical 
imagery. Because the result of the encryption of the previous pixels is taken into account 
for each pixel to be encrypted, the problem of homogeneous zones is solved. We are no 
longer dealing with block encryption systems, where two identical original blocks give 
the same encrypted block. We can observe that whatever the type of image with or 
without homogeneous zones, no texture appears in the encrypted images. In conclusion, 
in the case of stream cipher algorithms, the homogeneous zones are no longer visible 
either in the image or the histogram. Stream cipher method also carries another 
advantage: as the calculations which make it up are small in number, it proves to be very 
quick; even more so than AES. For example, a 7 MByte image is encrypted (or 
decrypted) in five seconds with a standard PC, rather than the 15 seconds required 
algorithms using a block encryption. 
 
10.4.4. Selective encryption of medical images 
 
Another way to ensure confidentiality is to adapt the protection level according to the 
application and the available time. It is in this second approach that we find selective 
encryption where users can apply a security level which can vary according to 
requirements [NOR 03]. Many applications can be protected with only selective 
encryption; the images are therefore partially visible, without revealing all the 
information. Selective encryption can be useful in the case of medical images taken with 
a medical device and needing to be sent over a network in order to be diagnosed 
remotely. Furthermore, the device used for capturing medical images may be located in 
an ambulance or some other mobile vehicle, and in this case the transmission is carried 
out via the intermediary of a wireless network.  Due to the vital nature of these images, 
they must be sent quickly and safely, and in this case a selective encryption seems to be 
the best solution (in terms of the time/security ratio). 
 
In this section we present a selective encryption method for medical images compressed 
with JPEG [PUE 06]. This method is based on the AES algorithm, using the OFB 
(Output Feedback Block) mode in the Huffman coding stage of the JPEG algorithm. The 
combination of selective encryption and compression allows us to save time in the 
calculation and to retain the JPEG format and initial compression rate. From a point of 
view of security, selective encryption guarantees a certain level of confidentiality. Many 
different selective encryption methods have been developed for images coded by DCT.  
Tang [TAN 96] proposes a technique called zigzag permutation, which can be applied to 
videos or images. Although his method offers a good level of confidentiality, it does 
decrease the compression rate. [DRO 02] describes a technique which encrypts a selected 
number of AC coefficients; the DC coefficients are not encrypted as they carry important 
visible information and are highly predictable. For this method, the compression rate is 
constant (compared to compression only) and retains the binary flow format. However, 
the compression and the encryption are carried out separately, so the method is slower 
than a simple compression. [FIS 04] presents a method where the data is organised in a 
binary flow form which can be regulated. Recently, Said has shown the strength of partial 
encryption methods by testing attacks which use the non-encrypted information of an 
image alongside a small image [SAI 05]. 
 
Let EK(Xi) be the encryption of a block Xi of n bits using the secret key K with the AES 
algorithm in OFB mode. In the description of the method, we will suppose that n = 128 
and Xi is a non-empty plaintext. Let us suppose that DK(Yi) is the decryption of a 
ciphertext Yi using the secret key K. The encryption is applied at the same time as the 
entropic coding procedure during the creation of the Huffman vector. The method works 
in three steps illustrated in figure 10.8: the construction of the plaintext Xi, the encryption 
of Xi to create Yi , and the substitution of the original Huffman vector with the encrypted 
information [ROD 06]. It should be mentioned that these operations are carried out 





Figure 10.8. Global overview of the proposed method 
 
To construct the plaintext Xi, we take the non-null AC coefficients of the current block i 
accessing the Huffman vector from its end towards its beginning in order to create 
{HEAD, AMPLITUDE} pairs. From each HEAD we obtain the size of AMPLITUDE in 
bits. Only the AMPLITUDEs (An, An-1,..., A1) are taken into account to build the vector 
Xi. The final length of the plaintext LXi depends both on the homogeneity ρ of the block 
and a given constraint C, with C ∈ {128, 64, 32, 16, 8} bits. This means that a block with 
a big ρ will produce a small LXi . The Huffman vector is processed as long as LXi ≤ C and 
the DC coefficient is not reached. Next, the padding function is applied, p(j) = 0, where j 
∈ { LXi,…, 128}, in order to fill in the Xi vector with zeros, if necessary. 
 
At the stage where X i is encoded with AES in OFB mode, the dynamic key Zi-1 is used as 
a parameter by the AES encryption in order to obtain a new dynamic key Zi. For the first 
iteration, the IV is created from the secret key K with the following strategy: the secret 
key K is used as a seed for a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). This K is 
divided into 16 sections of 8 bits each. The PRNG produces 16 random numbers which 
define the formation order of the IV. Next, each Zi is added by an XOR with the plaintext 
Xi to generate the encrypted block Yi. 
 
The final step is the substitution of the initial information with the encrypted information 
in the Huffman vector. As in the first step (the construction of the plaintext Xi), the 
Huffman vector is read backwards, but the coded vector Yi is read starting from the 
beginning and going to the end. Knowing the length, in bits, of each AMPLITUDE (An, 
An-1,..., A1), these sections are cut in Yi to replace the AMPLITUDE in the Huffman 
vector. The total quantity of bits must be LXi. This procedure is carried out for each block.  
Any homogeneous blocks are only slightly coded, or not at all. The use of the OFB 
method for coding allows for the generation of the independent Zi.. During the OFB-mode 
decryption stage, the dynamic key Zi is added by an XOR to the ciphertext Yi in order to 
regenerate the plaintext Xi. The vector resulting from the plaintext Xi is cut into sections 
from the end to the beginning in order to replace the AMPLITUDEs in the Huffman code 
to generate the Huffman vector. This method is applied to tens of medical images in the 
grey level (see example in figure 10.9). 
 
     
 
Figure 10.9. From left to right: original medical image of a colon cancer, 320x496 
pixels; encrypted image for C = 128; encrypted image for C=8 
 
The JPEG algorithm has been used with the online sequential coding system for a quality 
factor (QF) of 100%. Five values were applied for the constraint C (128, 64, 32, 16, and 
8).  For the encryption, the AES algorithm was used with the stream cipher mode OFB 
with a key of 128 bits in length. The original medical image of 320x496 pixels (figure 
10.9), compressed so that all the encrypted are of the same size: 43.4 KB.  The encrypted 
coefficients are distributed in the 2480 8x8 blocks in the image.  This means that there are 
no totally homogeneous blocks. For C = 128, maximum of 128 bits encrypted per block, 
26289 AC coefficients have been encrypted, which is an average of 33 encrypted bits per 
block. The percentage of encrypted bits in the image as a whole is 22.99%. That means, 
in the spatial domain, 136038 modified pixels, which means 85.71% of the coded pixels.  
The PSNR is of 23.39 dB for C = 128. For C = 8, the quantities of AC coefficients and 
bits encrypted are respectively 6111 and 16765. The percentage of encrypted bits in terms 
of the whole image is 4.7%. This constraint gives a number of modified pixels rising to 
76.1% of all the pixels in the image. The PSNR is then 30.90 dB. As the images show, 
selective encryption of the JPEG image produces block artefacts. These artefacts are at 
the borders between blocks, which often bother the HVS. Since the frequential 
transformation and the quantification of the pixel-blocks are treated separately, any 
continuity between the values of pixels in neighbouring blocks is broken during the 
coding. One of the advantages of this method is the possibility to decrypt individually the 
8x8 pixel blocks of the image (using the OFB mode for AES encryption). In order to 
form a remote diagnosis, the doctor needs to view regions of interest at a high resolution, 
where the background can be partially encrypted. We should note that confidentiality is 
linked with the ability to guess the values of the encrypted data (cryptanalysis). In terms 
of security, it is therefore preferable to encrypt the bits which seem the most random 
[PUE 05]. 
 
10.5.  Medical image watermarking and encryption 
 
10.5.1. Image watermarking and health uses 
 
The watermarking of images comes under the more general heading of information 
hiding: a message is embedded into a document, a host which may be text, sound, video, 
or images. For images, the signal of difference between the original image and its 
watermarked version corresponds to the watermark signal associated with the embedded 
message. Care must be taken to ensure that the watermarked host document has the same 




Figure 10.10. A watermarking chain 
 
With the link established between the message and its host, we see steganography, 
watermarking, and fingerprinting. Steganography is a form of secret communication 
where the host, who serves as the hidden communication channel, is of little interest to 
the message’s recipient. Watermarking and fingerprinting have come to the fore since 
1995, to meet the needs of managing DRM (Digital Right Management). Watermarking 
involves the insertion of a code identifying the owner, and fingerprinting involves the 
insertion of a trace linked to the buyer. Since then, other applications have been proposed 
for information security, such as copy control, restriction of access, and integrity control.  
For more details on watermarking applications and methods, please refer to Digital 
watermarking [COX 02]. From now on, the terms ‘watermarking’ and ‘data hiding’ will 
be used interchangeably. 
 
For medical imagery, several cases making use of watermarking can be identified [COA 
00]: 
- the authenticity of images with the insertion of data confirming the origin and the 
fact that a certain image refers to a particular patient; 
- controlling the integrity of images, by putting control information, such as a 
digital signature for example, within the image (section 10.3); 
- the addition of meta-data (data hiding), allowing the content of images to be 
enriched by attaching a semantic description of the content [COA 05]; 
 
Another, more detailed, scenario combines authenticity with integrity control of the 
images, and aims to establish a solid link between these images and the corresponding 
test results [COA 06]. In information protection [COA 03], watermarking is 
complementary to the mechanisms discussed above, as it merges the protection 
information and the image to be protected into one entity: a watermarked image. 
 




The data-hiding techniques proposed for using with images are numerous and varying in 
their approach. They do nevertheless have some common characteristics which, 
depending on the application, to be borne in mind when choosing the appropriate 
technique: 
- robustness: a method is classed as robust if after modification of the watermarked 
image (a ‘washing’ attack or simple image treatment) the hidden information can 
still be accessed and understood.  This property is essential for identifying images 
which undergo treatments or lossy compression; 
- capacity: this measurement expresses the embedding rate as the number of bits 
buried per pixel of the image (bpp, for ‘bit per pixel’) and therefore gives an 
indication of the message size which can be embedded in an image. Data hiding 
techniques aim to optimise this parameter and then add useful information to the 
images; 
- security: in some cases access to the watermark and its contents must be 
restricted; as for cryptography, there are symmetrical and asymmetrical 
watermarking methods; 
- complexity: is an indication of the calculation time needed for embedding and 
extraction; the complexity plays an important role when treating large image 
volumes; 
- invisibility: this is important for medical images, since a watermark must not 
interfere with the interpretation of an image, in order to avoid affecting the 
diagnosis. With this in mind, certain watermarking methods have been proposed 
specifically for medical imagery; 
- the need for the original image for decoding is also one of these characteristics; 
we say that a method is ‘blind’ if the original image is not required in order to 
extract the watermark; integrity control applications are not possible with non-
blind watermarking methods, the question of knowing whether the original image 
has been modified has no meaning in such cases. 
 
One method can meet certain applications independently, but not simultaneously. A 
compromise must be reached between capacity, robustness, and invisibility. A 
stronger watermark will better resist alterations to the signal introduced by the 
compression, or hacking attempts; but its presence will be more obvious to the user 
and its capacity will be reduced. 
 
10.5.2.2. The methods 
 
In their principles, watermarking methods proposed for medical imagery are only 
very slightly different from other methods which we can refer to as ‘classic’ methods.  
They make use of particular adaptation strategies specifically for medical imagery. 
 
In the habitual schemes, two types of algorithm can generally be identified. The first 
involves additive methods. Starting from a message (a sequence of bits), they 
generate a signal which is added to the image or a transformation of the image (DCT, 
DWT, etc). A technique involving spread spectrum links each bit bj of the message 
with the value dj = 1-2bj then multiplies this quantity by a pseudo-random sequence 
Wj low in energy which is then added to the image I to produce the watermarked 
image: Iw = I + αdjWj. α is a parameter of insertion or incrustation strength 
(robustness parameter). The embedding of a message of N bits adds to the image the 
watermark ∑ == Nj jjWdW 1α . The presence of this watermark is checked by correlation 
techniques, which implies the orthogonal nature of the pseudo-random sequences Wj.  
The sign of each correlation product gives the value of the embedded bit. The 
embedding of a large message can lead to a partially visible watermark W.  In order to 
ensure the invisibility of the watermark, psychovisual criteria are used to adapt the 
insertion strength to the image locally. 
 
The second group covers substitution methods which, to embed a bit of the message, 
replace a piece of information of the image (its grey levels or a transformation 
thereof) with a symbol from a dictionary. Detection therefore takes place with a 
simple re-reading. The method of Least Significant Bit (LSB) substitution is the 
simplest. This method simply replaces the LSB of an image’s grey levels with those 
of the message to be watermarked. For a grey level pixel p(n,m), this means 
associating the binary value 1 to the odd values of p(n,m), and the value 0 to the even 
values. This method is far from robust (it is therefore fragile) but does offer a capacity 
of 1 bpp. Since, more elaborate versions of this approach have appeared, following 
the Costa schema [COS 03]. These methods known as informed [COX 02] are based 
upon structured dictionaries which contain the values that the blocks of pixels will 
take to carry information. 
 
For medical imagery, three strategies have been established with the key aim of 
preserving the image interpretation. These are the methods above, methods involving 
Region of Non Interest watermarking, and reversible watermarking methods. 
 
The first methods produce watermarks which replace part of the information in an 
image. Using them requires careful attention to ensure that the watermark does not 
interfere with the diagnostic information. The first solutions proposed were 
techniques secretly modifying LSB of certain pixels, or coefficients of the transform 
of an image. These are methods with a large capacity, introducing only a slight 
damage to the original signal but nevertheless very fragile. More recently, robust 
techniques have been tested with, during the experiments, the involvement of a 
practitioner giving a threshold of insertion force which should not be crossed [PIV 
05]. More generally speaking, the problem with the automatic evaluation of the 
maximum authorised distortion level is a pertinent question. This problem is far from 
helped by the wide diversity of signals in the healthcare sector (cf. chapter 3) and the 
availability for practitioners of tools which allow, for example, the isolation of a 
certain part of the dynamic of an image. These ranges of grey levels vary according to 
the user, and some may find that the watermark is visible. 
 
One strategy suggested optimising the performance of the above methods in terms of 
robustness and capacity without further damage to the image is based on the existence 
in the image of regions with non or little interest for the image interpretation. These 
techniques, known as region of non interest watermarking, more often than not place 
the watermark in the black background of the image [COA 01]. Robustness can be 
achieved, with the watermark not masking any important information, although a 
strong watermark can cause hindrance for the physician during its image analysis. 
The embedding strength must be regulated. 
 
The final approach concerns the watermarking methods which are reversible. The 
idea is to be able to remove the watermark from the image, thereby restoring the exact 
same grey levels as in the original image. These techniques make it possible to update 
the contents of a watermark. This is not the case for the previous methods, where one 
watermark would have to be added to another. The drawback is that the watermarked 
image is no longer protected once the watermark has been removed. Such techniques 
have benefited from progress in recent years; [COA 05], [COA 06], [CAV 04],[COL 
07].  The techniques developed have variable performances depending on the host 
type to watermark and with performances lower than any non-reversible methods. 
Otherwise, these techniques are very rarely robust, and the desire to maximise the 
capacity often leads to highly visible watermarks: the watermark must be removed 
before the image can be used. 
 
Watermarking medical imagery is in its early stages at the moment, with the key 
difficulty encountered being the level of distortion which it introduces. We can 
however hope that the work carried out on improving the quality of image 
compression (chapter 5) will lead to solutions allowing the full benefits of 
watermarking to be appreciated. 
 
10.5.3. Confidentiality and integrity of medical images by data encryption and 
data hiding 
 
The applications of watermarking medical imaging are numerous. In this section, we aim 
to illustrate the combination of cryptography and watermarking in secure image 
exchange. We saw in section 10.3 that the encryption process could be either symmetrical 
or asymmetrical, by block or by stream. Whereas asymmetric algorithms are not 
appropriate for image encryption due to their calculation time, algorithms by block 
present security problems (due to homogeneous zones) and problems with the data 
integrity. Figures 10.11 demonstrate this problem. The AES block algorithm [AES 01] 
with a 128-bit key has been applied to the original image (figure 10.11.a) in order to 
obtain the encrypted image 10.11.b. If the encrypted image is modified during the 
transfer, it is not necessarily possible to detect this alteration. For example, in figure 
10.11.c a small region of the encrypted image has been copied and pasted onto another 
zone of the image. After decryption, it is possible to view the images, but their integrity 
cannot be guaranteed as shown in figure 10.11.d. 
 
a)  b)  c)  d)  
 
Figure 10.11. a) original Lena image, b) image encrypted by AES by 128-bit block, c) 
copy of a region of the encrypted, pasted onto another zone, d) decryption of (c) 
 
In order to solve the integrity problem, it is possible to combine a stream cipher algorithm 
with a secret key for the image and an asymmetrical algorithm to encrypt the secret key. 
A substitutive watermarking method (section 10.5) then allows for the embedding of the 
encrypted key into the encrypted image [PUE 04], [PUE 07].  If person A sends an image 
over a network to person B, sender A will use a stream cipher algorithm with the secret 
key K to encrypt the image. To send key K, A can encrypt it using an algorithm with a 
public key such as RSA. Let pub(e,n) be the public key and priv(d,n) the private key for 
RSA with e = d-1mod(n), so A has his public and private keys puba(ea,na) and priva(da,na), 
and B has his public and private keys pubb(eb,nb) and privb(db,nb). As a result, A generates 
a secret key K for this session and encrypts the image with the stream cipher algorithm.  
Next, A ciphers the key with the RSA algorithm using his private key priva in order to 
achieve a key K’: 
)mod(' a
d nKK a=  [10.10] 
This key K’ is encrypted a second time with RSA using the public key pubb of the 
recipient B to generate K’’: 
)mod('" b
e nKK b=  [10.11] 
The size of the message to be embedded into the image depends upon the size of the 
recipient’s public key and is known to the sender A and the recipient B. We can therefore 
calculate the embedding factor and calculate the number of blocks required for the 
embedding. This key K’’ is embedded into the ciphered image. Finally, A sends the image 
to B as shown in figure 10.12. This procedure of K encryption with priva and pubb ensures 
the authenticity, and only B can decrypt the image. The embedding of the key into the 
image makes the method autonomous and guarantees its integrity. If, during transfer, the 
image is attacked, then it is no longer possible to extract the right key on reception, and 
so the image cannot be decrypted. 
 
 
 Figure 10.12. Combination of secret key encryption, public key encryption, and a 
watermarking method 
Person B receives the encrypted and watermarked image, and can then extract the 
encrypted key K’’. He can then identify the sender, A, and decrypt the key K’’ using the 




d nnKK ab=  [10.12] 
 
With the acquired key K, B can decipher the image and therefore view it. Starting from 
the original ultrasound image (512x512 pixels), figure 10.13.a, we have applied a stream 
cipher algorithm with a key K of 128 bits, in order to obtain the encrypted image figure 
10.13.b. If this image is decrypted, we can note that there is no difference between it and 
the original image. The 128-bit key K was encrypted twice with the RSA algorithm in 
order to obtain K’’. Because of the length of B’s public key, the length of K’’ is in the 
region of 1024 bits. Next, using a watermarking technique in the spatial domain based on 
the LSB substitution, the key K’’ is embedded into the encrypted image (figure 10.13.c).  
The embedding capacity is of 1 bit for every 256 pixels. The difference between the 
watermarked, encrypted image and the original is shown in figure 10.13.d. The pixels 
used for the embedding are visible, the PSNR = 75.14 dB. After the decryption of the 
watermarked, encrypted image, in figure 10.13.c, we reach the final image shown in 
figure 10.13.e. The difference between the original image and the final one is shown in 
10.13.f. This figure shows that the differences between the two images (PSNR = 55.28 
dB) are spread throughout the image. Nevertheless, because the average value of the α(i) 
coefficients is equal to zero, the error due to the watermarking is not increased during the 
decryption stage. 
 
a)  b)  c)  
d)  e)  f)  
 
Figure 10.13. a) original image, b) encrypted image with a stream cipher algorithm with 
128-bit key, c) image (b) watermarked with the secret encrypted key, d) the difference 
between images (b) and (c), e) decryption of image (c), f) the difference between original 
image (a) and (e). 
 
In order to compare the results of this hybrid method, the watermarking method was 
applied to the encrypted medical image using the AES algorithm with the ECB and OFB 
modes (stream cipher mode). After decryption, the image watermarked and encrypted by 
AES in ECB mode shows a great deal of variation compared to the original image (PSNR 
= 14.81 dB). After decryption, the image watermarked and encrypted by AES in OFB 
mode presents variations which were not diffused by this mode. The final image quality 
is good (PSNR = 52.81 dB) but an overflow problem remains with the OFB AES mode.  
The black pixels become white, and vice versa. In conclusion, the combination of 
encryption and watermarking allows for an autonomous transmission system, and 




In this chapter, we have shown that there are many solutions for ensuring security when 
sending and storing medical images. In current practice, those solutions offered to secure 
medical data are based on very traditional protection techniques. These old approaches 
require either the introduction of certain specific mechanisms, or a longer execution time.  
These traditional approaches are not suitable for real-time applications or for access from 
a doctor’s surgery. Some of the solutions proposed in this chapter can be integrated into 
systems for sending medical images, if they can be proven robust. The main advantage of 
all these hybrid approaches is the ability to link several types of coding in one algorithm.  
In years to come, the appearance of standards in the encryption and watermarking of 
images will be of great benefit to the safe transmission of medical data. 
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